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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

VERA S.KING,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
— vs. —

Case No.
8071

F. F. HINTZE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1950 the plantiff and appellee, Vera S.
King, and one Edwin G. Kidder (herein designated
Assignors) and the defendant and appellant, F. F.
Hintze, (herein designated Assignee) entered into a written contract which is the basis of this action. The said
contract is plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and was formally admitted in evidence (R. 2, 296). By this contract the
Assignee agreed:
1. To organize a corporation under the laws of the
State of Nevada to be capitalized for $500,000.00 divided
into 5,000,000 shares of the par value of ten cents each,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of which amount 2,490,000 shares were to remain in the
company treasury to be sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of at such times and for such purposes as the
Board of Directors shall determine. All shares were to
be fully paid and non-assessable.
2. To execute and deliver to the corporation to be
organized by Assignee a quit claim deed conveying all of
Assignee's right, title, claim and interest in and to 13
certain unpatented lode mining claims situated in White
Pine County, Nevada, designated as Dolomite Nos. 1 to
12, inclusive, and Gap lode mining claim.
3. To transfer and deliver to the Assignors 1,250,000 shares of the capital stock of said mining corporation
to be organized by the Assignee in payment of a certain
lease and option and certain unpatented lode mining
claims hereinafter described.
4. To take possession of the mining claims described in the agreement and all appurtenances thereto
and within thirty days commence actual mining operations and perform the work requirements of the lease
and option hereinafter described necessary to perpetuate
same and maintain same in good standing.
By this contract the Assignors:
1. Agreed to assign to the Assignee (and by said
agreement the Assignors did assign to the Assignee) all
of the right, title and interest of the Assignors in and to
a certain mining lease and option dated November 1,
1948, wherein William Isaacs and Otto Isaacs did lease
and let unto Edwin Gr. Kidder (one of the Assignors),
2
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certain lode mining claims situate in White Pine Mining
District, White Pine County, Nevada.
2. Agreed to execute and deliver to the Assignee
or to the company to be organized by him a quit claim
deed conveying all of the right, title, claim and interest
of the Assignors in and to certain lode mining claims
situate in White Pine County, Nevada, and described as
follows:
King Nos. 1 to 7, inclusive, unpatented lode mining claims
Kidder-King Nos. 1 to 8, inclusive, unpatented
lode mining claims
Helena lode unpatented mining claim
Mid-Dolomite Nos. 7 and 8 unpatented lode mining claims
Charter Oak patented lode mining claim, survey
No. 52-86, Patent No. 23319
An undivided ys interest in the Monitor Eeindeer
patented lode mining claim, Survey No. 127,
Patent No. 23319.
3. Granted to the Assignee the exclusive right and
option for a period of sixty days to purchase from
Assignors 250,000 shares of the capital stock of the corporation, which Assignors were to receive for a total purchase price of $20,000.00.
4. Warranted that there were no outstanding debts
or liens against the property to be conveyed by the
Assignors and the said mining lease and option, and that
the same are free and clear of debts and claims of any
kind, and should any claims arise out of operation of

3
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claims in the past the Assignors will hold the Assignee
harmless of all liabilities and expense of litigation which
may arise out of same.
5. Gave immediate possession of said mining claims
to Assignee.
6. Allowed Assignee, as consideration for his covenants in the agreement and for the assignment of mining
claims claimed to be ow^ed by Assignors, to issue to himself 2,510,000 shares (including the 1,250,000 shares to
be transferred to Assignors) of the capital stock of the
corporation to be organized by him.
The Assignee did not organize the corporation contemplated by the aforesaid agreement (B. 257).
The Assignor King (plaintiff and appellee) instituted and prosecuted this action against the Assignee
Hintze (defendant and appellant) to secure judgment
awarding said Assignor, King, damages for Assignee's
breach of contract arising out of his failure to organize
the corporation contemplated by the agreement. Although
Edwin Gr. Kidder was named a party defendant, he was
never served with process of court (B. 56). Kidder died
December 20, 1952 (B. 22). The motion of the Assignee
(defendant and appellant) to make Kidder's personal
representative a party to the action (E. 21-24) was denied
by the trial court (E. 25, 26). The trial was held on May
18, 19, 20, 1953, before a jury, which returned a verdict
in favor of Assignor King (plaintiff and appellee) for
nominal damages in the sum of six cents, and general
damages in the sum of $4500.00 (E. 284). The motion of
the Assignee Hintze (defendant and appellant) for judg4
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ment notwithstanding verdict (E. 286, 287) was denied
(E. 288). Thereupon said defendant and appellant perfected his appeal to the Supreme Court from said judgment (E. 289-295, 297).
The trial court instructed the jury that as a matter
of law the defendant and appellant Hintze had breached
the contract above described and had offered no evidence
constituting a defense and that plaintiff and appellee
was entitled as a matter of law to nominal damages.
(Instruction No. 1; E. 270, 271). There was then submitted to the jury under four separate instructions the
question as to whether or not plaintiff and appellee was
entitled to general damages, and if so, the amount of
same (Instructions 2, 3, 4, 5; E. 272-274).
As a defense to the cause of action asserted against
him by plaintiff and appellee King, the defendant and
appellant, Hintze, specifically set forth in his amended
answer (E. 28-33) his contention that the unpatented
lode mining claims, King Nos. 1 to 7, Kidder-King Nos.
1 to 8, Helena and Mid-Dolomite claims Nos. 7 and 8,
never had a legal existence at any time, and particularly
did not exist on June 24, 1950, the date upon which
Exhibit 2 was executed. Hintze further alleged in his
amended answer that neither the aforesaid Kidder nor
the plaintiff and appellee King had any right, title, claim
or interest in and to said unpatented lode mining claims
at the time of execution of the contract above described
on June 24, 1950, and that at no time either before or
after June 24, 1950 did said Kidder and King hold any
right, title, claim or interest in and to said unpatented
5
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lode mining claims (E. 30). Said Hintze further alleged
that the non-existence of said claims and their fictitious
nature became known to him long after June 24, 1950
and only when he attempted to organize a corporation
which was to own and operate said claims (R. 30, 31).
On this premise, Hintze asserted that it was impossible
for Kidder and King to convey to him or to the company
which he undertook to form the said unpatented lode
mining claims and that such failure and inability of Kidder and King constituted a major and material breach
of the contract dated June 24, 150 by plaintiff and appellee King, and absolved and discharged him from the
duty of organizing the corporation contemplated by said
contract (R. 31). The trial court by its Instruction No.
1 (R. 270, 271), directed the jury that the defendant and
appellant Hintze had failed to establish his defense. The
fundamental question on this appeal is whether or not
the trial court committed error on this issue.
The defendant and appellant Hintze introduced evidence as to the requirements of the laws of the State of
Nevada with respect to the location of lode mining claims
in that state. The following statutory provisions were
operative at the time the locations of the King Nos. 1 to
7, Kidder-King Nos. 1 to 8, Helena, Mid-Dolomite Nos.
7 and 8, were made. The quotations are from Hillyers
Comp. Laws of Nevada, 1929:
Sec. 1563:
"The location and transfers of mining claims
heretofore made shall be established and proved
in contestation before courts, by the local rules,
regulations, or customs of the miners in the sev6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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eral mining districts of the territory in which such
location and transfers were made." (K. 159)
Sec. 4120:
"Any person who is a citizen of the United
States, or who has declared his intention to become such, who discovers a vein or lode, may
locate lode mining claim thereon by defining the
boundaries of the claim in the manner and within
the time hereinafter prescribed, and by erecting
or constructing at the point of such discovery a
monument of the size and character of any of the
several monuments prescribed in section 2 of this
act and by posting in or upon such discovery
monument a notice of such location, which must
contain: First — The name of the claim; Second
— The name of the locator or locators; Third —
the date of the location; Fourth — The number of
linear feet claimed in the length along the course
of the vein, each way from the point of discovery,
with the width claimed on each side of the center
of the vein and the general course of the lode or
vein, as near as may be." (R. 160-161)
Sec. 4121:
"The locator of the lode mining claim must
sink a discovery shaft upon the claim located four
feet by six feet to the depth of at least ten feet
from the lowest part of the rim of such shaft at
the surface, or deeper, if necessary to show by
such work a lode deposit of mineral in place; a
cut or crosscut or tunnel which cuts a lode at a
depth of ten feet or an open cut along the said
ledge or lode, equivalent in size to a shaft four
feet by six feet by ten feet deep, is equivalent to
a discovery shaft. The locator must define the
boundaries of his claim by removing the top of a
tree (having a diameter of not less than four

7
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inches) not less than three feet above the ground,
and blazing and marking the same, or by a rock in
place, capping such rock with smaller stones, such
rock and stones to have a height of not less than
three feet, or by setting a post or stone one at
each corner and one at the center of each side
line. When a post is used, it must be at least four
inches in diameter by four and one-half feet in
length set one foot in the ground. When it is
practically impossible, on account of bedrock or
precipitous ground, to sink such posts, they may
be placed in a mound of earth or stones, or where
the proper placing of such posts or other monuments is impracticable or dangerous to life or
limb, it shall be lawful to place such posts or
monuments at the nearest point properly marked
to designate its right place. When a stone is used
(not a rock in place) it must be not less than six
inches in diameter and eighteen inches in length
set two-thirds of its length in the top of a mount
of earth or stone, four feet in diameter and two
and one-half feet in height. All trees, posts or
rocks used as monuments, when not four feet in
diameter at the base, shall be surrounded by a
mound of earth or stone four feet in diameter by
two feet in height, which trees, posts, stones or
rock monuments must be so marked as to designate the corners of the claim located; provided,
however, that the locator of a mining claim shall
within twenty days from the date of posting the
notice of location define the boundaries of said
claim by placing at each corner and at the center
of each side line one of the hereinbefore described
monuments, and shall within ninety days of the
date of posting said location notice perform the
location work hereinbefore prescribed." (E. 161,
162)
8
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Sec. 4122:
"Any locator or locators of a mining claim,
after having established the boundaries of said
claims, and after having complied with the provisions of this act with reference to the establishment of such boundaries, may file with the district mining recorder a notice of location, setting
forth the name given to the lode or vein, the number of linear feet claimed in length along the
course of the vein, the date of location, the date on
which the boundaries of the "claim were completed, and the name of the locator or locators.
Should any claim be located in any section or territory where no district has been as yet formed,
or where there is no district recorder, the locator
or locators of such claims may file with the county
recorder, notice of location as set forth above, and
said notice of location will be prima facie evidence
in all courts of justice of the first location of said
lode or vein. Within ninety days of the date of
posting the location notice upon the claim the
locator shall record his claim with the mining
district recorder and the county recorder of the
mining district or county in which such claim is
situated by location certificate which must contain : First — The name of the lode or vein; Second — The name of the locator or locators; Third
— The date of the location and such description
of the location of said claim, with reference to
some natural object or permanent monument, as
will identify the claim; Fourth — The number of
linear feet claimed in length along the course of
the vein each way from the point of discovery,
with the width on each side of the center of the
vein, and the general course of the lode or vein
as near as may be; Fifth — The dimensions and
locations of the discovery shaft or its equivalent,
sunk upon the claim; Sixth — The location and
9
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description of each corner, with the markings
thereon. Any record of the location of a lode mining claim which shall not contain all the requirements named in this section shall be void. All
records of lode or placer mining claims, millsites
or tunnel rights heretofore made by any recorder
of any mining district or any county recorder are
hereby declared to be valid and to have the same
force and effect as records made in pursuance of
the provisions of this act. And any such record,
or a copy thereof duly verified by a mining
recorder or duly certified by a county recorder
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." (R, 163,164)
The mining claims were located for Kidder and King
in the autumn of 1949 (R. 51, 124) by an engineer named
Casselli who lived in Ely, Nevada (R. 52). Kidder had
been employed by Reynolds (who was obviously a promoter) to do this work. The location work consisted
of driving location posts measuring 4 x 4 inches or
4 x 6 inches, into the ground or supporting them with a
pile of stone where the earth was too firm and could not
be penetrated. On these location posts were nailed cans
in which were placed the location notices (R. 54, 124,
126). A witness for Mrs. King (Reynolds) asserted that
the claims were "interlaced with ore showings." (R. 125).
There was no location work done on the claims — "no
shaft sunk, no digging." (R, 125, 126, 128). Nothing was
done except placing the location stakes or monuments
(R. 126). No notice of location was ever recorded either
in the office of the Recorder of the White Pine Mining
District or White Pine County, Nevada (R. 126). Casselli
was employed by Reynolds on behalf of Kidder and King
10
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only to erect the discovery stakes or posts and to place
the notices in the cans which were affixed to the stakes
(R. 127).
The unpatented lode mining claims were never conveyed by Kidder and the plaintiff and appellee, King,
to Hintze, the defendant and appellant, or to any company organized by Hintze (R. 250) although shortly
before Kidder's death he delivered to Hintze a file containing correspondence in regard to the transaction
involved in this action (R. 253). Among the papers was
a deed (Ex. 8, R. 258) which had been signed by Kidder,
(R. 251) but not by King, wherein Hamilton Silver
Mines, Inc. was grantee. This instrument described MidDolomite Nos. 7 and 8, Helena, Charter Oak and Monitor
Reindeer, but did not describe the Kidder-King and King
claims (R. 254).
(Special Note: The alleged unpatented mining
claims known and designated as King Nos. 1 to 7, KidderKing Nos. 1 to 8, Helena and Mid-Dolomite Nos. 7 and 8,
will be for convenience hereinafter be designated as the
Kidder-King claims.)
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ALLEGED KIDDER-KING UNPATENTED MINING CLAIMS WERE MERE FICTIONS ON JUNE 24,1950.
THEY HAD NO LEGAL EXISTENCE AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT, TITLE,
CLAIM OR INTEREST IN AND TO THE SAME.
1. The location of the Kidder-King claims was not distinctly marked on the ground so that their boundaries could be readily traced, as required by 30
11
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U.S.C-A., 28, (R.S. 2324).
The evidence clearly establishes the fact that the
Kidder-King claims were located in the autumn of 1949
by an engineer named Casselli, who was employed by
Reynolds to do this work. At this time Casselli simply
erected location posts and nailed cans thereto in which
were placed the location notices. Reynolds in his testimony makes it clear that nothing was done except placing these location stakes or monuments. There was no
effort made to place markers in the ground so that the
boundaries of each claim could be readily traced. This
was manifestly the status of these so-called claims on
June 24, 1950, the date on which the parties executed the
contract which is the subject of this action. Over six
months had elapsed between the date of posting the
notices of location and the execution of the contract, as
Reynolds repeatedly stated in his testimony that these
locations were made in the autumn of 1949. The status
of the law with respect to this situation is clear.
Congress had definitely provided the method by
which lode mining claims should be located. R.S. 2324
(30 U.S.C.A. 28) provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The miners of each mining district may
make regulations not in conflict with the laws of
the United States, or with the laws of the State
or Territory in which the district is situated,
governing the location, manner of recording,
amount of work necessary to hold possession of
a mining claim, subject to the following requirements : The location must be distinctly marked on
the ground so that its boundaries can be readily
traced. * * " (Emphasis supplied)
12
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Lindley discusses this statute as follows:
"The Eevised Statutes of the United States
contain the mandatory provision, that the 'location must be distinctly marked on the ground so
that its boundaries can be readily traced.' There
is no escape from this requirement. While it is
possible that state statutes or local district regulations may particularize as to the character of
the marking, they cannot dispense with the necessity for compliance with the law of congress.
While, as we shall hereafter point out, time is
allowed within which to establish the boundaries,
until this is done the location is not complete.
The requirement is an imperative and indispensable condition precedent to a valid location, and is
not to be 'frittered away by construction.' After
the discovery, it is the main act of original location. This was the rule under the Spanish and
Mexican law. The object of the law in requiring
the location to be marked on the ground is to fix
the claim, to prevent floating or swinging, so that
those who in good faith are looking for unoccupied ground in the vicinity of previous locations may be enabled to ascertain exactly what has
been appropriated, in order to make their locations upon the residue. It also operates to determine the right of the claimant as between himself
and the general r^vernment." (2 Lindley on
Mines (3rd Ed.), Sec. 371)
"In order to prevent the swinging or floating
of claims and to apprise other explorers of the
amount of unappropriated ground still available,
the Federal statutes declare that 'the location
must be distinctly marked on the ground so that
its boundaries can be readily traced;' and in many
mining areas this somewhat cryptic enactment
has been supplemented by miners' rules or state
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

legislation, prescribing the methods to be followed
and fixing a time for compliance. In other words,
it is just as essential that the boundaries of a
claim be duly marked as it is that a notice be
posted, and it appears to be definitely settled that
a failure to comply with this requirement nullifies
the location and makes it inoperative to segregate
the land included therein from the public domain
— at least during the continuance of the default."
(36 Am, Jur. Mines and Minerals, Sec. 89, page
341)
"One of the imperative requirements of the
statute, an indispensable condition precedent of a
valid location, is that it shall be 'distinctly raarked
on the ground so that its boundaries can bo readily
traced' (R. S. 2324)." {Gleeeson v. Martin White
Mining Company, 13 Nev. 442, 35 Pac. St. R., 442
at 456.)
"That the staking of the surface boundaries
of the claim has been required upon all surface
locations made since May 10, 1872, has been
repeatedly decided. * * These decisions are not
made upon local statutes, but as the construction
of 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 28 (R.S. Sec, 2324); nor can
we see how any other construction can be contended for. It follows, therefore, that since May
10, 1872, surface staking along the bounds of the
claim has been required in all cases, without regard to State, Territorial or District legislation
requiring such staking. Such legislation, when it
existed, has been to direct the details of the taking, but a sufficient staking has been required
under the Act of Congress whether the local rule
has been silent or outspoken on this point. * *"
(Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed., page 48)
"It will be observed that the statute nowhere
14
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requires that the boundaries be marked. The
requirement is that the location be marked so the
boundaries can be traced. We think that where
the notice of location gives the length and breadth
of the claim from the discovery monument, and
three corners are properly marked, and the centers of both end lines are also properly marked,
there ought to be no difficulty in tracing the entire
boundary, under ordinary circumstances." (Warnock v. DeWitt, 11 Utah 324, 40 P. 205.
"And where a discovery of mineral has been
made, and a proper location notice filed, then, if
the boundaries are marked on the ground, before
intervening rights have accrued, the claim will be
valid. The locator, however, delays at his peril,
since thereby he assumes the risk of intervening
rights of third parties." (Emphasis supplied)
(Brockbank v. Albion Min. Co., 29 Utah 367, 81
P. 863)
"But if the Portland notices were so posted,
and the claims were not staked or monumented
within 90 days thereafter, then we think the locations were not completed under the act of Congress and the state statute, and, the land not having been marked within that period, so that its
boundaries could be traced, it was not segregated from the public domain, although such posting carried the right to define the boundaries
within 90 days. The period for this purpose has
since been shortened by an act of the legislature
to 20 days. St. 1907, p.'419, c. 194." (Nash v. McNamara, 30 Nev. 114, 93 P. 405, 16 L.K.A. (N.S.)
168)
"The rule adopted in Nevada is that where
the prior locator posts the requisite notice, and
properly marks the boundaries of the claim within
15
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the statutory period, the ground becomes segregated from the public domain from the date of
posting the notice, so that during the statutory
period for perfecting the location the area embraced in the claim will not be open to location
by others, or until after a failure to do the other
work required to be done within such period."
(Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming
Copper
Co., 18 Wyo. 234,106 P. 673)
"The discovery is manifestly the source of
the title, and vests the discoverer with the prior
right to complete his location. He could only lose
this prior right to perfect his claim by a failure
within a reasonable time to mark his location so
that the boundaries could be traced upon the
ground." (McCleary, et al. v. Broaddus, et aL, 14
Cal.App. 60, 111 P. 125.)
"As applied to the location in question, there
were at least two essential facts required by Kev.
St. U. S. Sec. 2320, 2324 (U. S. Comp. St, Sec.
4615, 4620,) viz: (1) The discovery of mineral
within the claim; and (2) the marking of the location on the ground so that its boundaries may be
readily traced. Lindley on Mines, Sec. 328. Until
the requirements of law are complied with, a location is not perfected. The decisive question in
this case is whether the record establishes the fact
of a valid location of the plaintiffs' mining claim,
and, if so, as of what time." (Gibbons et al v.
Frazier et al, 68 Utah 178, 249 P. 472.)
"The authorities further hold, however, as
plaintiff concedes, that where notice is properly
posted, but the locator does not remain in possession of said claim or distinctly mark the same on
the ground so that its boundaries can be readily
traced, the location is invalid as against a subse16
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quent locator who complies with the requirements
of the statute. * * In other words, * * a party can
show a right to the possession of a mining claim
(when no patent has issued) only by showing an
actual pedis possessio as against a mere wrongdoer, or by showing a compliance with the requirements of law." {Be Witt v. Sides, 81 Cal. App.
643, 254 P. 668.)
"We see nothing in the case to justify a verdict,
or decision, upon such general grounds as were
stated by the Court. The Act of Congress in
question provides (Sec, 2324, R. S.), that 'the location must be distinctly marked on the ground, so
that its boundaries can be readily traced/ Since
the passage of that Act, a party can show a right
to the possession of a mining claim (when no
patent has been issued) only by showing an actual
pedis possessio, as against a mere wrong-doer,
or by showing a compliance with the requisites of
the Act of Congress. There is no pretense of any
actual possession of the whole claim other than by
compliance with the Act. The true questions for
decision, therefore, were: Which party had complied with the requirements of the law, and was
prior in time; not which, 'on the whole, had the
better right.' " (Funk v. Sterrett, 20 Pac. St. Rep.,
(Cal.) at 614.)
See also United States v. Sherman, 288 Fed. 497;
Gelcich v. Moriarty; 53 Cal. 217, 18 Pac. St. Rep. 217;
Eaton v. Norris, 131 Cal. 561, 63 P. 856.
"Pedis Possessio. Lat. A foothold fan actual
possession. To constitute adverse possession there
must be pedis possessio, or a substantial incloure." (Black's Law Bictionary, Third Edition,
page 1343.)
"Pedis Possessio or Possession Pedis. Actual
17
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bona fide occupation; actual occupancy; actual
possession; a foothold upon land accompanied
with the real and effectual enjoyment of the
estate, with the reception of its fruits, its rents,
issues, and profits; occupancy in fact of the whole
that is in possession; subjection to the will and
control; substantial possession. Pedis possessio
is usually evidenced by occupation, by a substantial inclosure, by cultivation, or by appropriate use according the particular locality and
quality of the property." (48 C. J., page 779)
It is manifest that the locators of the Kidder-King
claims made no attempt whatsoever to comply with the
requirements of the federal statute concerning the marking of the claims on the ground so that the boundaries
could be readily traced. Neither did these locators comply or even attempt to comply with Sec. 4121, Comp.
Laws of Nevada, 1929, which definitely charges the
locator of a mining claim, within 20 days from the date
of posting the notice of location, with the duty of defining the boundaries of said claim by placing at each corner and at the center of each side line a monument of
the nature specifically defined by the statute. It follows
that the plaintiff agreed to convey her right, title and
interest in claims which had no existence. It is no defense
to this assertion to reply that Kidder and King could
assert a possessory right against a third party trespasser for the reason that neither of them had an actual
bona fide occupation of the claims within the meaning
of the rule of law that gives a person in possession of
a mining claim superior rights against a trespasser. All
that Eeynolds caused Casselli to do, according to
18
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Reynolds' statement, was to drive stakes in the ground
and post notices of location thereon. Neither under the
federal statute nor the law of Nevada did this constitute
the location of a mining claim. Kidder and King had
absolutely no shadow of title to the Kidder-King claims.
They were non-existent; they were mere imaginings in
the mind of Reynolds.
Professor Lindley summarizes the situation presented in this case with respect to a locator who fails to
comply with the statutory mandate requiring the marking of claims on the ground:
"If he fails to comply with the law within the
statutory period, his rights would thereafter be
no greater than the rights of one in possession
without discovery. He might protect his pedis
possessio against forcible intrusion and hold it
against one having no higher right; but he would
be a mere occupant without color of title, and his
possession must yield to anyone possessing the
necessary qualifications, who enters peaceably
and in good faith for the purpose of perfecting a
valid location." (2 Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.),
page 794, Sec. 339)
2, The locators of the Kidder-King claims failed to
perform the location work within ninety days of the
date of posting the location notice, as required by
Section 4121, Volume 2, Nevada Compiled Laws,
1929.
Lindley writes thus of the provisions of the statute
requiring a discovery shaft:
"Of the precious metal-bearing states, California and Utah have thus far enacted no laws
requiring work of any character to be thus far
enacted no laws requiring work of any character
19
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to be performed as a prerequisite to the completion of a location; therefore, as to these states
this article is inapplicable.
"The states and territories hereinafter enumerated, however, have supplemented federal legislation by requiring that certain preliminary
development work in the nature of a discovery
shaft, or its equivalent, shall be performed within
a specified time as a condition precedent to the
completion of a lode location. This legislation has
been held to be valid.
"As these state statutes are frequently important factors necessary to be considered in construing and applying decisions of the state courts,
we will present an outline of the provisions found
in the several states and territories upon this
subject, taking the state of Colorado as a basis of
comparison." (2 Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), page
795-6, Sec. 343)
"Nevada: The posting of a notice is required,
and before the expiration of ninety days thereafter the locator must sink a discovery shaft to a
depth of at least ten feet from the lowest part of
the rim of such shaft at the surface, or deeper if
necessary, to show by such work a lode deposit of
mineral in place. A cut, crosscut, or tunnel which
cuts the lode at a depth of ten feet, or an open
cut along the ledge or lode equivalent in size to a
shaft four feet by six feet by ten feet deep is
equivalent to a discovery shaft." (The ninety day
provision has been changed to twenty days.) (2
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 343, page 779)
"The time limit fixed in these statutes would
seem to be mandatory. A discoverer could not
extend it by simply renewing notices or changing
20
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dates on the old notices, as against one making a
location after the statutory period following the
original discovery and notice had expired." (2
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 344, page 805)
"His original discovery will protect him in
his possession during the statutory period, but if
he permits that period to elapse, and fails to perform his development work and accomplish the
results contemplated by law, his possession must
yield to the next comer who succeeds by peaceable
methods in initiating a right. As is said by Mr.
Morrison, the neglect of the locator to comply
with this requirement is equivalent to an abandonment of the inchoate right given by discovery.
The discovery has performed its office. The perfected location rests ultimately on the completed
development work. This we understand to be the
rule announced by Judge Hallett in the AdelaideCamp Bird case, and we are not aware of any
adjudicated case to the contrary." (2 Lindley on
Mines, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 345, p. 807-8)
"The requirement as to disclosing the vein,
crevice, or deposit in place, which terms are legal
equivalents, is unquestionably mandatory. What
constitutes such a vein is to be determined by the
rules announced by the courts in the adjudicated
cases, which have been fully presented in preceding articles, and need not here be repeated." (2
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 346, p. 809-10)
"Discovery and Discovery Shaft Distinguished. The fact of discovery is a fact of itself,
to be totally disconnected from the idea of discovery shaft. The discovery shaft is a part of
the process of location, subsequent to discovery.
If a lode, for instance, be discovered in a cross-cut
run to operate some other known vein, or if a
21
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prospect hole be dug on the outcrop of a lode, and
no steps are taken to stake and record such hole,
it becomes no more the property of the owner of
the cross-cut, or of the party who dug the hole,
than if he had never happened to strike it.
Although he could have followed up the discovery
by perfecting title, his neglect so to do is equivalent to abandonment of the inchoate right given
by discovery." {Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th
Edition, p. 29)
"Discovery Hold How Long? A discovery in
Colorado, Wyoming, North and South Dakota,
Montana and Oregon holds the claim for sixty
days alloted to sink the discovery shaft. * *
Alaska, Arizona,, New Mexico and Washington
allow ninety days. Idaho allows sixty days, but
claim must be staked within ten days after discovery. Nevada allows ninety days from date of
posting location notice, but requires the monuments to be placed within twenty days from date
of posting." (Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th
Edition, p. 33)
"The validity of the provisions of said statute
with reference to discovery work is directly involved in this case, and presented for determination on this appeal. The determination of this
question will dispose of. the case, and we do not
deem it material to consider or pass upon the
many other questions discussed by counsel. In
Colorado and several other states the work as
specified in the Nevada statute is required to be
performed as a prerequisite to the completion of
a location. The same character of work is required in other states, but it is not made, in terms
at least, necessary to complete a location, but
rather, as we think, a condition to the continuance
of the right acquired by location. We regard it
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as entirely immaterial whether, under state legislation in reference to discovery work, the performance thereof be regarded as a necessary act
of location, or as a condition to the continuance
of the right after location. If such legislation is
valid in the one case, it is in the other. * * *To
enable a party to maintain a right to a mining
claim after the right is acquired, it is necessary
that the party continue substantially to comply,
not only with the laws of Congress, but with the
valid laws of the state and valid rules established
by the miners, in force in the district where the
claim is situated upon which such right depends.
Failure to comply with such laws and rules works
a forfeiture, whether the laws and rules provide
for forfeiture for noncompliance or not, and the
mining claim becomes subject to location by any
qualified locator." (Sissons v. Sommers, 24 Nev.
379, 55 P. 829)
"If defendant's location was invalid because
of the absence of a discovery cut, at the time
plaintiff made peaceable entry, then the territory
within the boundaries of defendant's claim was at
the time open to location under the mining laws,
and plaintiff could lawfully initiate his location
within the boundaries of the Iva C. claim, irrespective of what his belief was as to territory being
unoccupied and unappropriated (Lindley on
Mines, vol. 1, Sec. 219); and, if the Iva C. location
was invalid for such reason, it was immaterial to
the validity of plaintiff's location that plaintiff
knew that the claim of defendant had been surveyed for patent, and the boundaries had been
marked on the ground, and that the situs of the
claim was known to him, and that the defendant
had posted his patent plats and notices. If the
location of defendant was invalid for the reasons
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assigned, plaintiff was not a trespasser when he
attempted to initiate his location therein. The
jury ought to have been plainly told that, if
defendant's claim was invalid for the reason
assigned, the plaintiff could initiate his location
within the boundaries of such claim." {Walsh v.
Henry, 38 Colo. 393, 88 P. 449)
"Taking advantage of the discretion accorded
by the Federal statute, a number of states have
supplemented the locational requisites hereinbefore noticed by requiring the performance of a
specified amount of development work within a
prescribed period after the making of a discovery,
such as the sinking of a shaft in such manner as to
disclose the vein or crevice that carries the
mineral.
"It is clear, of course, that the position of the
discovery shaft is of no importance in jurisdictions wherein the sinking of such a shaft is not
demanded. And even where such a requirement is
made a locational requisite, it seems that a shaft
is not rendered ineffective by the circumstance
that it extends a few inches over the boundary of
an adjoining claim." {36 Am, Jur., Mines and
Minerals, Sec. 88, p. 340)
"There is no doubt that, if the locator discovered a vein and filed proper notices on the
Portlands on the unappropriated public domain,
he was entitled to go on the ground and mark the
boundaries, and in doing so float the locations and
do the required work; but, if he never did anything but post the notices, it would seem that no
piece of ground was ever defined for segregation
from the public domain, so as to notify or warn
off others, or prevent the initiation of locations
which would be good against a later one." {Nash
v. McNamara, supra, at page 412)
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In 7 L.R.A. (N. #.), at page 839, may be found an
annotation which makes the following statement:
"Under the Federal mining laws, in the
absence of state or local regulation, a location of
a mining claim is complete upon proper discovery
and marking the claim upon the ground. Nothing
in the way of discovery or development work is
required to complete it; and this applies to the
existing conditions in California and Utah in
which no such regulations have been adopted. In
most of the other mining states and territories,
however, Federal legislation on this subject has
been supplemented by requirements for the performance of certain work in the way of development after discovery, which is a condition precedent to the completion of the location.
"These requirements Have usually taken the
shape of a provision for the sinking of a discovery
shaft upon the lode or vein discovered, or for an
equivalent thereto."
There is also contained in this annotation a reference
to the decisions which hold that work in the way of sinking a discovery shaft or the equivalent is required to be
performed as a prerequisite to the completion of location
and that a locator thus failing to comply with the statute
cannot hold the claims as against a junior locator, and
this is true whether the laws and rules provide for a forfeiture for non-compliance or not.
Section 4121, Compiled Laws of Nevada, 1929,
specifically quoted above, requires the sinking of a discovery shaft measuring 4 feet by 6 feet to a depth of at
least 10 feet from the lowest part of the rim of such shaft
at the surface, or deeper, if necessary to show by such
25
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work a lode deposit of mineral in place. A cut or crosscut or a tunnel which cuts a lode at a depth of 10 feet or
an open cut along the said ledge or lode equivalent in
size to a shaft 4 feet by 6 feet by 10 feet deep is equivalent to a discovery shaft. This location work must be
performed within ninety days from the date of posting
the location notice.
The evidence in this case without contradiction
shows that no discovery shaft was sunk on the KidderKing claims, nor was any crosscut or tunnel excavated.
Therefore, for this additional reason, on June 24, 1950,
there had been no location of the Kidder-King claims,
and as before stated, they were mere imaginings in the
head of the promoter, Keynolds.
The information as to the purported location of the
Kidder-King claims came entirely from the mouth of
Reynolds, and by his testimony he proved that the
Kidder-King claims had no existence and were mere
creations of his imagination. All that had been done was
to post notices of location. Neither had the boundaries
been marked so that they could be readily traceable on
the ground, nor had the discovery work been done. The
area covered by these purported claims was on June 24,
1950, part of the public domain. The locators of these
imaginary claims had no more interest in them than some
stranger. They had no actual possession of the ground,
and even as against a stranger they had no rights. Plaintiffs own proof, beyond a shadow of a doubt, showed
that neither Kidder nor the plaintiff King had any title
or ownership or any kind of interest in these supposed
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and fictitious mining claims on the date they entered into
the contract with the defendant, Hintze, and they were
charged with knowledge of such fact. When they covenanted and agreed to quit claim their right, title and
interest in these claims, they were entering into an agreement concerning non-existent property.
Plaintiff and appellee attempted to explain the
absence of the location work required by Sec. 4121, Compiled Laws of Nevada, 1929, by introducing evidence
of alleged custom of the miners in the White Pine Mining District with respect to the doing of this work (K.
54, 55, 56). The witness Reynolds was asked whether he
knew of the custom of the area with regard to the extension of time due to weather conditions within which to
do the location work (R. 56). Sec. 4121 specifically requires that this work be done within ninety days of the
date of posting the location notices, and the authorities
above cited indicate that such requirement is mandatory.
The objection of defendant to this type of testimony (R.
56) should have been sustained. If any custom existed,
it could not excuse the non-execution of the location work
in the face of the statutory requirement.
II.
THE CONTRACT DATED JUNE 24, 1950 BETWEEN
KIDDER AND THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, KING,
ON THE ONE PART AND THE DEFENDANT, HINTZE,
ON THE OTHER PART, DEFINITELY IMPLIES THAT
KIDDER AND KING HAD SOME RIGHT, TITLE, CLAIM
AND INTEREST IN AND TO THE KIDDER-KING
CLAIMS WHICH THEY WOULD CONVEY AND WHICH
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WOULD PASS TO AND BECOME ASSETS OF THE
CORPORATION TO BE FORMED BY DEFENDANT.
1. A contract should receive a reasonable interpretation consistent with the purpose of the contract and
intentions of the parties as expressed by the language of the contract and as shown by the surrounding facts and circumstances existing at the
time the contract was executed.
"The rules for construing agreements of promoters do not differ from those that apply to
other contracts. If such a contract is phrased in
language of dubious meaning, it must be construed and interpreted, like other contracts, in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the promoters, the objects they aimed to attain, and the
results they contemplated." (13 Am. Jur., Corporation, Sec. 127, p. 266)
u

I n the interpretation of an agreement, the
surrounding circumstances at the time it was
made should be considered for the purpose of
ascertaining its meaning, but not for the purpose
of adding a new and distinct undertaking. In
interpreting an agreement, a court should, to the
best of its ability, place itself in the situation
occupied by the parties when the agreement was
made and avail itself of the same light which the
parties possessed when the agreement was made
so as to judge of the meaning of the words and of
the correct application of the language to the
things described. * * *" (12 Am. Jur., Contracts,
Sec. 247, p. 784)
"If it were a contract between P a r r y and a
corporation, anticipated, but not yet in existence,
there could be no recovery. If, on the other hand,
it were a contract between individuals, there
might be, if the testimony warranted it; and that
28
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is the principal question argued here. It seems
to be conceded — at least it is to us apparent —
that the contract is confusing, and that, unless
light may be thrown upon its meaning by surrounding circumstances, the intention of the parties in several important respects will remain in
doubt. But, reading the instrument in the light
of the situation of the parties at the time and of
the object to be accomplished, we may be aided in
reaching a satisfactory construction. How, then,
were the parties situated, and what did they
undertake to dof' (Mosier et al v. Parry, 60 Ohio
St. 388, 54 N.E. 364, L.E.A. 1918E, 834)
"One of the contentions is that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written instrument. It is assumed by defendant that
the instrument in question is unambiguous and
self-explanatory. If that were true, defendant's
contention would be indisputable, but we have
already determined that there is a latent ambiguity in the instrument as to whether or not it
conveyed an exclusive permit to defendant or a
right in common with other parties. This ambiguity opened the door for the admission of evidence
as to the understanding of the parties at the time
the instrument was executed." (Boley v. Butterfield, 57 Utah 262,194 P. 128,131)
"Where the parol evidence offered does not
tend to vary or contradict the terms of the writing, but merely to explain a latent ambiguity, we
know of no respectable authority that holds it to
be inadmissible." (Egelund v. Fayter, 51 Utah
582,172 P. 313-14)
"Where the language is mixed and susceptible
of more than one construction, the court should
attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the
29
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situation of the parties to the contract at the time
the agreement was entered into, so that it may
view the circumstances as viewed by the parties
themselves to be enabled to understand the language used in the sense with which the parties
used it. In order to accomplish this purpose it is
generally proper for the court to take notice of
the surroundings and attendant circumstances and
consider the language used in the light of such
circumstances." (Read v. Forced Under firing Corporation, 82 Utah 529, 26 P. (2d) 325-27)
"While it is true that parol evidence may not
be permitted to vary the terms of a written contract, it is equally true that in construing a contract all parts of it are to be considered, and the
circumstances surrounding its making to be regarded, with a view of arriving at the true intent
of the parties." (Mebius & Drescher Co. v. Mills,
150 Cal. 229, 88 P. 917.)
"It is elemental, in construing a contract, that
its purpose, its nature, and subject matter should
be considered. A construction giving an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will
be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and
between two possible constructions that will be
adopted which establishes a valid contract."
(Schofield v. Z.C.M.L, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d)
342, 96 A. L . R . 1089.)
The foregoing authorities teach that in determining
the intentions of the parties to a written contract, the
court is first charged with the duty of examining the
language actually used in the contract, and if there exists
an ambiguity therein, it may resort to the surrounding
facts and circumstances as an aid to its interpretation
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of the agreement. These rules of interpretation are of
peculiar application to the contract involved in this
action, inasmuch as it reveals upon its face a definite
ambiguity which, in order to clarify it, requires the
assistance of parol evidence.
The contract is a typical promotion contract between
parties who mutually agree to furnish properties for
the organization of a mining corporation. Upon the
security of these properties, shares of stock were to be
issued. Kidder and King were to receive a specified
number of shares of stock for the assignment of the
Isaacs lease and option and the conveyance to Hintze,
or the company to be organized by him, of the KidderKing claims. Hintze, on the other hand, was to receive
a specified number of shares of stock of the new corporation for his services in organizing the new company,
and also in consideration of the quit claiming by him to
the company of "all his right, title and interest in and
to" 12 certain unpatented lode mining claims. This contract certainly contemplated that assets and properties
would be conveyed to the new corporation which had
actual existence, both factually and legally.
One of the pertinent covenants made by Kidder and
King reads as follows:
"The said Edwin G. Kidder and Vera S.
King hereby agree to execute and deliver to F. F.
Hintze or to the company to be organized by him
a quit claim deed or deeds conveying all of their
right, title and interest in and to the following
named unpatented lode mining claims situated in
Sections 24, 25, 30, 31 and 36, Township 16 North,
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Eanges 57 and 58 East, in White Pine County,
State of Nevada, to-wit;" (Here follows a specific
description of the claims.)
By a further provision of the contract Kidder and
King warranted that there were no outstanding debts or
liens against "the said property" and their mining lease
and option (meaning the Isaacs lease and option) and
that the same were free and clear of debts and claims of
any and all kinds, and should any claims arise out of
their operations of said claims in the past, they agreed
to hold said assignee free and harmless from all liabilities and expenses of any litigation that might arise out
of any such debts and/or claims.
The agreement on its face clearly designates it as
a promotion agreement, having for its ultimate purpose
the organization of a mining corporation to take, hold
and operate the Isaacs lease and option and also the
unpatented lode mining claims which the respective parties agreed to quit claim to the new corporation. The
question arises as to whether or not the requirements of
this contract would be satisfied merely by the parties
executing quit claim deeds to the corporation whereby
the right, title and interest of the grantors, whatever
they may be, were conveyed, or whether by the contract
the parties intended that Kidder and King on the one
hand, and Hintze on the other ,should convey to the
corporation unpatented mining claims which had actual
legal existence. The uncertainty of the contract in this
regard opens the door for the consideration of all evidence and circumstances surrounding this transaction.
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2. A provision in a corporate promotion agreement
that a party will convey his right, title, claim and
interest in and to land or other property by quit
claim deed unto the corporation to be organized
under the agreement does not absolve him from all
liability or responsibility except the execution and
delivery of such quit claim deed and does not operate
as a reservation of immunity on his part, while the
contract remains executory, from all liability for his
reservation of immunity on his part, while the contract remains executory, from all liability for his
want of title to the land or other property, where the
contract itself and surrounding facts and circumstances show that the parties intended the contract
to be based on the premise that the party did in
fact own a substantial title, right or interest in and
to the property to be conveyed to the proposed
corporation.
"A provision in a contract for the sale of land
that the vendor shall give a quitclaim deed or
other conveyance of less worth than a general
warranty deed does not necessarily absolve him
from any obligation other than the execution of
such a deed, and operate as a reservation or
immunity on his part, while the contract remains
executory, from all liability for his want of title.
That the purchaser has agreed to take a deed
without warranty is not necessarily a waiver of
the right to demand a clear title; on the contrary, the fact that a warranty in the conveyance
is waived has been said to be all the stronger
reason why he should insist on the cancelation of
all liens and encumbrances, since he will have no
warranty to fall back on if the title should prove
to be defective. Even though the contract merely
calls for a conveyance of the vendor's right, title
and interest in the land, other provisions may so
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indicate the character of title called for as to require the character of title so indicated. In a case
in which the court stated that a grantee in a quitclaim deed has the same rights as a grantee in a
deed of general warranty where the deed purports
on its face to convey the land, a contract was held
to show an intent to sell a good title and to require
such a title where the first part of the contract
was in the ordinary form of a contract for the sale
and conveyance of the land although the contract
subsequently provided for the giving of a quitclaim deed upon the full payment of the purchase
price and 'upon surrender' of the contract. It has
also been held that where the agreement is for a
deed without warranty of all the vendor's 'right,
title and interest' in certain land, the vendor is
bound to show that he has some right, title or
interest which he can convey. Such an agreement
implies that the vendor has some right, title or
interest which will pass by a conveyance, and if
he has none the stipulation on his part is a nullity
and the contract will be rescinded at the instance
of the purchaser." (55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 160, p. 630)
"But is seems that, even though the contract
merely calls for a conveyance of the vendor's
right, title and interest in the land, other provisions may so indicate the character of the title
the vendor is to convey as to control. * * * But it
seems that, regardless of protective provisions
inserted in behalf of the vendor, he cannot successfully invoke the aid of equity to require the
vendee to accept a conveyance of land, where he
has no title whatever thereto." (57 A. L. R., 128081)
"An agreement to convey by quitclaim deed
does not require the vendor to convey a good
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title, unless the contract shows that the parties
intended to contract for the land and not merely
for the vendor's interest, whatever it might be.
But a contract to deliver a good and sufficient
deed is breached where the vendor without title
tenders a quitclaim deed sufficient in form; although under a contract for a good title, a quitclaim deed is sufficient, if the grantor has the
title.' (66 C. J., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 522,
p. 851)
"Bespondent undertook to buy something
more than a chance title. This the contract shows.
To segregate the words 'a quitclaim deed to said
premises,' and hold her to the legal import of
those words, without reference to their relation
to other words and covenants in the contract,
would be an injustice to the buyer and do violence
to accepted rules of construction. If a party
agrees to sell land, it is in legal effect an agreement to sell a title to the land. In the absence of
a stipulation to the contrary, the law implies an
undertaking on the part of the vendor to make a
good title. 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 606; Ankeny
v. Clark, 1 Wash. 549, 20 Pac. 583; 2 Warvelle
on Vendors (2d ed.) 836. The form of conveyance
is a secondary consideration. There may be reasons for giving or receiving a quitclaim deed.
These will not be inquired into so long as that
form of deed will convey the title agreed to be
conveyed, in the contract itself.
"'* * #THe impression prevails to some extent
that an agreement to sell lands by quitclaim deed
or other conveyance of less worth than a warranty
deed absolves the vendor from any obligation
other than the execution and delivery of his deed;
that it is a reservation of immunity on his part
from all liability in damages for a breach of his
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contract or failure of title. This is erroneous. The
effect of a quitclaim deed was considered in the
case of Ankeny v. Clark, 1 Wash. 549, 20 Pac.
583, where, after some discussion, the court said:
«• * • Under the statutes of our territory, a quitclaim deed is just as effectual to convey the title
to real estate as any other form of deed, and a
grantee in a quitclaim deed is entitled to the same
presumptions as to bona fides, and has the same
rights, as a grantee in a deed of general warranty.
This is undoubtedly true of a quitclaim deed
which purports on its fact to convey, not merely
an interest, but the real estate itself.'" (Davis v.
Lee, 52 Wash. 330,100 P. 753)
When the court places itself in the position of the
parties to the contract, it will quickly sense the fact that
they were clearly acting on the premise that Kidder and
King actually held legal ownership of the Kidder-King
unpatented mining claims and that the status of the
title of those claims was such that Kidder and King and
the corporation could assert it successfully against the
whole world. There is not a suggestion on the face of
the contract nor in the testimony at the trial that the
parties contemplated any other ownership by Kidder
and King than an absolute one which would stand
inviolate against the intrusion on the properties by
others. The fact that these claims were to form part of
the underlying assets of the corporation to be formed
by the defendant is certainly indicative that the parties
themselves intended that that corporation would have an
ownership in the claims which it could assert against
trespassers or claim jumpers. The above cited authorities show that the covenant upon the part of Kidder and
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King to execute and deliver a quit claim deed conveying
their right, title and interest in the Kidder-King claims
was not performed by a simple execution of the deed.
Their undertaking carried the definite and explicit implication that Kidder and King had some kind of substantial ownership in the claims. The following quotation from Johnson v. Tool, 1 Dana (Ky.) 479, 25 Am. D.
162, is much in point:
"An undertaking to convey all the vendor's
'right, title and interest,' but without general
warranty, implies that he has some right, title and
interest which can constitute the subject of a contract, and which can pass by the conveyance to
the vendee. If the vendor has no 'right, title or
interest,' the stipulation on his part amounts to a
nullity. It cannot be presumed, that a vendee
would ever engage to pay money for nothing.
We are, therefore, of opinion, that it was incumbent on the vendor to exhibit a title, and shew
himself able to make it to the vendee. We do not
mean that the vendor was bound to shew the best
title, nor even a title regularly derived from the
commonwealth. But we thing he was bound to
present such a state of case as would show that
he at least had some right. A naked possession
might be such a right as would, if transferred and
conveyed, satisfy the covenant on his part. But
the vendor has not shewn that much."
Paraphrasing this excerpt, it cannot be supposed
that Hintze would have undertaken the obligation to
organize a corporation and to convey his unpatented
claims to it on the mere promise of Kidder and King to
convey whatever interest they might have in and to the
Kidder-King claims. Rather, the conclusion is that the
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covenants of Kidder and King required them to convey
to Hintze or to the corporation a substantial title or
interest in and to the Kidder-King claims.
Any other interpretation of the contract than that
above urged immediately suggests inimical complications
to the existence and well-being of the corporation. The
evidence in the case clearly shows that Kidder and King
and their representative Keynolds contemplated that
shares of stock of this corporation would be sold to the
public. This would, of course, require a qualification
under the "Blue Sky Law" (7U.C. A. 1953, Sec. 6-1-1 to
6-1-41). It is difficult to imagine that the Securities
Commission would grant a license to sell shares of the
stock of this corporation upon showing of the status of
the title to the Kidder-King claims. As hereinbefore
demonstrated, these claims did not exist, and neither
Kidder nor King had any ' right, title or interest" in and
to any such claims as described. They could not own any
interest or title in something that did not exist. Hence,
their covenant to convey to the corporation or to Hintze
their right, title and interest, was breached.
III.
THE INABILITY OF KIDDER AND THE PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE KING TO CONVEY TO THE DEFENDANT, OR TO THE CORPORATION TO BE ORGANIZED
BY HIM, SOME SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OR INTEREST
IN THE KIDDER- KING CLAIMS CONSTITUED A
BREACH OF THE PROMOTION CONTRACT OF SUCH
NATURE AS TO DEFEAT ITS PURPOSE AND RELIEVE
AND DISCHARGE THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT HINTZE FROM THE DUTY OF ORGANIZING THE
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CORPORATION CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT.
1. A breach by one party that goes to the essence or
root of the contract justifies a refusal of the other
party to perform his promise and discharges his
obligation to perform, even though there has been
a partial performance on the part of the first party.
"Where promises which form the consideration for each other are concurrent or dependent,
the failure of one party to perform will discharge
the other, and one cannot maintain an action
against the other without showing performance,
or a tender of performance, on his part, unless
such performance has been excused, the general
rule being that a person who has himself broken
a contract cannot recover on it. Where acts are
to be performed by each party at the same time,
neither party can maintain an action against the
other without performance, or tender of performance, on his part. So where a party sues on a
special contract to recover compensation due on
its performance, he must show performance on
his part or a lec^al excuse." (13 Corpus Juris,
Contracts, Sec. 694, p. 627-9)
<<* * * Where there has been part performance
[of a contract] and there is a breach of a promise
which goes to only a part of the consideration and
the breach may be compensated for in damages,
the breach does not relieve the other party from
his obligation to perform his promise. In order to
operate as a discharge, the partial failure to perform must go to the very root of the contract.
But a breach that goes to the essence of the contract justifies a refusal of the other party to perform his promise or discharges his obligation to
perform, even though there has been part per-
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formance. In other words, a breach of a promise
which goes to the whole consideration gives to the
injured party the right to treat the entire contract as broken. Where the failure to perform
p a r t of a contract is in regard to matters which
would render the performance of the rest a thing
different in substance from what was contracted
for, the party not in default may abandon the contract. A plaintiff who has committed a substantial
breach cannot recover where the promises are
dependent. I t may be observed that where there
is such a material breach, the plaintiff has not
substantially performed." (12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 343, p. 901)
"When the failure to perform the contract is
in respect to matters which would render the performance of the rest a thing different in substance from what was contracted for, so far as we
are advised the authorities all agree that the
party not in default may abandon the contract."
{Balance v. Van Uxem, 191 111. 319, 61 N.E. 85)
"A substantial failure of consideration is a
ground for rescission." (Larson v. Thomas,
S. D
, 215 N.W. 927, 57 A.L.R. 1246-1250)
"The maxim, 4De minimis non curat lex,' does
not apply in such a case. That maxim can only
apply to imperfections in title so slight that the
court can say of them the parties to the action
did not have such defects in contemplation, and,
if they had, they would have disregarded them.
It may be that the plaintiffs intended to lay out
the farm in a high-class residence district. In
fact, something of the kind may be inferred from
the evidence. The title search brought to the
plaintiffs' knowledge the recorded grant made by
Requa of a perpetual easement to construct and
maintain over the farm a line of telegraph and
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telephone poles and wires. That may have been
a very objectionable incumbrance in the eyes of
the plaintiffs, and I think it would be a very
startling proposition for the court to say that it
was a defect in title which may be disregarded in
this action at law." (Fossume v. Requa, 218 N. Y.
339,113 N. E. 330-332)
"The necessity of surfacing the streets in the
subdivision, in order to improve the premises, is
apparent, and in so far as defendant's rights are
concerned, the surfacing of the entire street upon
which his lot abutted was of paramount importance to him. The putting in of watermains, sidewalks, and sewers was of little avail, if the street
remained unsurfaced so that he and others might
not have a convenient way to and from his property. Merely to have surfaced the street in front
of the one lot would be absurd. We think that the
noncompliance by plaintiff in this respect amounts
to a substantial and material breach of the covenant to improve.
"The plaintiff and his assignors, therefore,
being guilty of a substantial breach of a dependant covenant, cannot maintain this action." (Pcdmrer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252, 264 N. W. 361, 104 A.
L. E. 1057-1061)

See also Braseth v. State Bank of Edinburg,
N.D
, 98 N.W. 79; Southern Colonization Co. v.
Derfler,
Fla
, 75 So. 790, L. R. A. 1917F, 744;
Weathered v. Weathered, 115 Kan. 744, 224 P . 901.
"Failure of consideration is the failure to
execute a promise, the performance of which has
been exchanged for performance by the other
party. Among other situations, the failure may
arise from the wilful breach of the promise. And
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in a bilateral contract, such failure of consideration is a defense to an action for a breach of the
contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the
performance of the unilateral promises shall be
in exchange for each other, the performance being
considered as equivalent in value." (Bliss v. California Co-op Producers, 30 Cal. 2d (Adv. 237) 181
P. 2d 369,170 A.L.E. 1009-16)
"It does not follow that because a technical
rescission has not been made, and cannot be made,
that a defendant cannot avail himself of the defense of failure or want of consideration. For
practical purposes, there is no difference in the
effect upon the agreement between the successful
defense of want or total failure of consideration
and the successful termination of an action to
rescind it. In either case, the agreement is rendered incapable of enforcement, the judgment
being a bar to any future action, so far at least
as parties to the action, or those concluded by it,
are concerned." (12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 359,
p. 926)
"In other words, the stipulations were dependent, in which case the failure of one party to
perform will discharge the other, and one cannot
maintain an action against the other without
showing performance or a tender of performance
on his part unless such performance has been
excused." (Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 154
So. 134,102 A. L. R. 1073-1079)
2. A plaintiff must allege and prove performance of
the contractual obligations assumed by him in order
to maintain an action against the defendant for a
breach of the contract.
"Having pleaded a fulfillment of all of the
terms and conditions imposed upon him by the
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contract, plaintiff failed in the proof. * * * The
plaintiff having failed to prove his performance
of the contract, he cannot recover damages from
the defendant." (Niederhauser v. Jackson Dairy
Co., (Iowa) 237 N. W. 222-224)
"Plaintiff, having pleaded full performance
of the contract, could not recover without establishing that fact. * * * The plaintiff, therefore,
having alleged performance, was bound to establish that fact, and failing to do so, no recovery
could be had." {Stem v. McKee, 70 App. Div. 142
( N . Y . ) , 7 5 N . Y . S.157)
"It is the settled law of this state before
recovery can be had upon a contract, that plaintiff
must show either that he substantially performed
or tendered performance of the conditions on his
part to be performed." (Thomas v. Matthews,
Ohio St
, 113 N. E. 699, L. E. A. 1917A,
1068-1074)

"Where the promises or covenants in an
agreement are mutual and dependent or concurrent, plaintiff must aver performance, or at least
an offer to perform on his part, or a legal excuse
for non-performance." (13 Corpus Juris, Con^
tracts, Sec, 848, p. 725)
I t has been demonstrated that Kidder and King, on
June 24, 1950, had no title to the Kidder-King claims,
nor any other right or interest in these alleged claims.
Although approximately nine months prior to that date
they had caused to be erected location notices on a certain part of the public domain, they had utterly failed
to comply with the requirements of both the Federal and
Nevada statutes to perfect the title to these claims. Their
failure to mark the claims on the grounds so that their
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boundaries could be readily traced, and their failure to
excavate the location shaft totally destroyed the inchoate
rights created by the posting of the location notices. Over
six months had elapsed since the location notices were
posted, and inasmuch as the marking of the boundaries
and the digging of the discovery shaft were mandatory
requirements of law, the failure to comply with such
mandates within the time specified in the statutes terminated all right, title and interest of Kidder and King
in and to these putative claims long prior to June 24,
1950. The evidence shows beyond contradiction that on
June 24, 1950 neither Kidder nor King nor any of their
agents or representatives held actual possession or occupancy of the ground upon which an attempt had been
made to locate these claims. Hence, Kidder and King
did not hold the color of even a possessory right in the
putative claims.
Kidder and King breached the covenant of their
contract whereby they agreed to convey to the defendant,
or to the corporation to be organized by him, their right,
title, claim and interest in and to these putative claims,
because they held no right, title, interest, claim or possession in and to said putative claims. Such breach went to
the heart of the contract. It is true that Kidder and King
assigned to the defendant and appellant the Isaacs lease
and option covering other properties, but the properties
•contained within the lease and option were only a part
of the assets which were to be owned and held by the
intended corporation.
Reynolds' testimony demonstrates that the Kidder44
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

King claims surrounded the properties described in the
Isaacs lease, and according to his testimony they
afforded substantial protection to the Isaacs properties
and at the same time possessed intrinsic value. The parties to the agreement did not intend that the Isaacs lease
and option should be the only asset of the corporation.
They intended that the assets of the corporation should
consist of the Isaacs lease and option, the Kidder-King
claims, and the Hintze claims. A corporation whose
assets do not include the Kidder-King claims would not
be the same corporation as that contemplated by the
parties to the agreement. Such a corporation would be
an entirely different entity from one that owned and
possessed the Isaacs lease and option, the Kidder-King
claims and the Hintze claims — all of which would have
formed an operating unit. The assertion that Kidder
and King substantially performed their agreement by
assigning the Isaacs lease and option does violence to
the contract and imposes on the defendant the acceptance
of a corporation entirely different from that contemplated by the parties.
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she and
Kidder had fully performed all of the obligations imposed upon them by the contract (R. 1). This allegation
recognizes the rule of law above stated that a plaintiff
must allege the performance of the contractural obligations assumed by him in order to maintain an action
against a defendant for breach of the contract, He must
do something more than this: He must prove such allegation. In this case the plaintiff utterly failed to prove
that Kidder and King had performed their part of the
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contract. Rather, plaintiff's own proof showed that she
and Kidder had breached the contract in a material, substantial manner and that such breach was in the form of
a failure of consideration, which went to the root of the
agreement. Under such circumstances the trial court
committed highly prejudicial error in instructing the
jury that the defendant had failed to present a defense
to plaintiff's cause of action. It was a grievous error,
which permeated the jury's verdict. It is submitted that
the defendant's and appellant's motion for dismissal and
non-suit (R. 248) and his motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict (R. 286) should have been granted, and
that the trial court committed reversible error in its
Instruction No. 1, wherein it was declared that the
defendant had presented no evidence which would amount
to a defense of plaintiff's cause of action and instructing the jury as a matter of law that the defendant had
breached the contract as claimed by the plaintiff, and
that plaintiff was entitled, therefore, to nominal damages
(R. 270-271).
W H E R E F O R E , defendant and appellant prays that
the Supreme Court will set aside the judgment against
him in favor of plaintiff, and that it order and direct
the trial court to dismiss this action against defendant
with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER,
F R E D L. FINLINSON
H. J. HINTZE
Attorneys for Defendant
Appellant.
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